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The objective in war is a better state of peace. To prove this proposition, we will not present a history of the Iran-Iraq conflict.
After all, Saddam's war against Iran spanned eight years, over twice as long as the United
States' involvement in the Second World War. Rather, this paper focuses on key elements of Saddam's grand strategy. We will first review Iraq's strategic environment and then examine how Saddam executed his strategy by dividing the war into three 
Strategic Content
Given his political and strategic milieu, Saddam went to war for a traditional real politik motive…to safeguard his position. In late spring of 1988, Saddam launched a campaign to bring the war to an end.
The first battle recaptured the Al Faw Peninsula. In a two-axis attack, the Iraqi army moved under the cover of darkness, used special forces to prepare a breakthrough, called upon over 300 air force sorties to isolate the battlefield, included an amphibious assault to envelop the Iranian forces, and used well timed gas attacks to immobilizes the defenses in place. 37 In the final battle, the Iraqi army advanced 40 miles into Iran using similar 34 Robins, page 52. 35 Initially, he set a limited military objective-to defeat the Iranian army in battle-which would not achieve the desired political endstate-to dissuade Khomeini from intervening in internal Iraqi affairs. Saddam accentuated his mistake by not employing the Iraqi armed forces in a suitable manner to achieve his military objectives. The Iraqi army was not prepared for the combined arms offensive required nor for the urban warfare that followed the failed armor offensive. Saddam foundered into a stalemate that allowed Khomeini to transform the conflict into an unlimited conflict for survival. 38 Antal, page 67. 39 Davis, page 16.
After enduring a violent counteroffensive, Saddam orchestrated all his strategic tools to achieve a revised political objective-the survival of his regime. Saddam synchronized his diplomatic overtures with his economic and military offensives. He employed all his forces with a significant degree of sophistication to convince Khomeini to accept the UN ceasefire. The sum of these initiatives combined to be far greater than any single one could have achieved alone. Ultimately Saddam gained incomparable synergistic effects and demonstrated a mastery of statecraft.
In the beginning, Saddam's failure in setting a national strategy got him bogged into a bloody quagmire. In the end, his ability to finesse these tools successfully extracted him from the desperate situation. Saddam had to, though, because a peace status quo ante was a better state than the war he initiated.
